Secured Inv. Corp v. Myers Executive Bldg. Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 43402 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-19-2016
Secured Inv. Corp v. Myers Executive Bldg.
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43402
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Secured Inv. Corp v. Myers Executive Bldg. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43402" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6250.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6250
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SECURED INVESTMENT CORP., a 
Wyoming Corporation, NO. 43402-20015 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MYERS EXECUTIVE BUILDING, 




APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DISTRICT COURT CASE No. CV-14-8898 
HONORABLE RICH CHRISTENSEN, DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING 
Jeff R. Sykes, ISB #5058 
McConnell Wagner Sykes & Stacey, PLLC 
827 East Park Blvd., Ste. 201 
MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT, ISB# 6911 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
Boise, ID 83712 
Telephone: (208) 489-0100 
Facsimile: (208) 489-0110 
Email: sykes@mwsslawyers.com 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Myers Executive Building, LLC 
601 E. Front Ave., Ste. 502 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0517 
Fax: (208) 664-4125 
Email: mschmidt@lukins.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Secured Investment Corp 
FIL 
JAN 1 9 2016 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE ........................................................................................... 1 
A. Nature of the Case .......................................................................................................... 1 
B. Course of Proceedings ................................................................................................... 2 
C. Statement of Facts .......................................................................................................... 2 
R., Pp. 137, 144-145 ....................................................................................................................... 5 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL ............................................................................ 11 
III. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 11 
A. Standard ofReview ...................................................................................................... 11 
B. The District Court did not error by refusing to set aside the Default Judgment 
pursuant to IRCP 60(b) (4) because the Judgment was not "void." ............................ 13 
C. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by not setting aside the Default 
Judgment due to mistake, surprise or excusable neglect under IRCP 60(b)(l) .......... .23 
D. The District Court's finding that Myers waited an unreasonable time before 
moving to set the default judgment aside is not clearly erroneous, and as such, its 
decision to deny Myers' motion to set aside should be upheld .................................. .29 
E. Myers failed to demonstrate that it possesses a meritorious defense ........................... 30 
F. The Default Judgment was a final judgment under IRCP 54(a) ................................. .34 
G. The district court properly awarded SIC its attorneys' fees and costs ......................... 34 
H. This Court should deny Myers' attorneys' fees and costs on appeal and should 
award SIC its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against the appeal. ..... 35 
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 35 
01228102.3 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutes 
Idaho Code§ 5-508 ................................................................................................................. 19, 20 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) ................................................................................................................ 35 
Idaho Code§ 28-22-104 ............................................................................................................... 10 
Other Authorities 
7 Moore's Federal Practice§ 60.25[2] (2d ed. 1975) .................................................................... 13 
Blacks Law Dictionary 940 (7th ed. 2000) ................................................................................... 31 
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2857 ................................... 12 
Rules 
I.R.C.P. 7(a) .................................................................................................................................. 31 
I.R.C.P. 1 l(b)(3) ........................................................................................................................... 15 
I.R.C.P. 12(b) ........................................................................................................................ 1, 4, 18 
I.R.C.P. 14 ..................................................................................................................................... 31 
I.R.C.P. 15(a) ................................................................................................................................ 16 
I.R.C.P. 54(a) ................................................................................................................................ 34 
I.R.C.P. 55(b) ........................................................................................................ 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 
I.R.C.P. 55(c) ................................................................................................................................ 12 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) ......................................................................................................................... passim 
Idaho Cases 
Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355 (1984) ............................................................. 34 
Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321 (Ct.App.1983) ................................................ 23 
Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549,224 P.3d 1138 (2010) ............................................................ 31, 32 
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525 (Ct. App. 1988) .................................................................... 23 
Catledge v. Transport Tire Company, Inc., 107 Idaho 602, 691 P.2d 1217 (1984) ............... 14, 15 
Danz v. Lockhart, 132 Idaho 113 (Ct. App. 1998) ................................................................. 26, 27 
Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 991 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1998) ...................................... 12 
Engleman v. Milanez, 13 7 Idaho 83 (2002) .................................................................................. 18 
Evans v. Galloway, 108 Idaho 711 (1985) .................................................................................... 22 
Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho 57 (1983) ........................................................................................ 16 
First Security Bankv. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,570 P.2d 276 (1977) ............................................ 13 
Fisherv. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341,528 P.2d 903 (1974) .................................................... 13 
Flood v. Katz, 143 Idaho 454 (2006) ............................................................................................ 11 
Hearst Corp., v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10 (1979) ............................................................................... 30 
Idaho State Police v. Real Property, 144 Idaho 60 (2007) ............................................... 11, 30, 31 
Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927,342 P.3d 639 (2015) ................ 34 
Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, I 09 Idaho 56 (Ct. App. l 985) ............................................................ 15 
Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,221 P.3d 81 (2009) .................................................... 11, 12, 29 
Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663,672 P.2d 231 (1983) ............................................. 14, 15, 16 
Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho 198, 795 P.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1990) ..................... 13, 14, 15, 16, 23 
Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 720 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1986) ..................................... 13, 24, 25 
Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v. Charles J. Webb & Co., 36 Idaho 442 (1922) .................................. 18 
11 
01228102.3 
Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302 (1983) ...................................................................................... 13 
Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 152 P.3d 2 (2006) ................................................ 34 
Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319, 193 P .3d 866 (2008) .......................................... 1 8, 31 
Rodell v. Nelson, 113 Idaho, 945 (Ct. App. 1988) ..................................................... 27 
Schraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753 (Ct. App. 1987) ........................................................ 22 
Shelton v. Diamond Int'l Corp., l 08 Idaho 93 5 (1985) .......................................................... 23, 29 
Smith v. Washington Cnty., 150 Idaho 388,247 P.3d 615 (2010) ................................................ 34 
Via/ax v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................................................ 29 
Villa Highlands, LLC v. Western Comm. Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 598, 226 P .3d 540 (2010) ............ 11 
Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 1n v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913 
(Ct. App. 1993) ............................................................................................................................ 23 
Foreign Cases 
Accord, Patterson v. Rockwell International, 665 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn.1984) ................................. 15 
R.F. v. D.G. W., 192 Colo. 528,560 P.2d 837 (1977) ................................................................... 15 
U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 P.2d 121 (Wyo.1983) ................................... 15 
Federal Cases 
Charlton L. Davis & Co. P.C. v. Fedder Data Center, 556 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.1977) .................. 15 
HF. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 
432 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir.1970) ..................................................................................................... 16 
Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merchandising, Inc., 538 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2008) .............................. 12 
In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875 (C.A.9 1993) .................................................................. 16 
Maynard v. Nguyen, 2011 WL 3904099 (2011) ........................................................................... 30 
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 127 (2nd Cir. 2009) ............................................ 11 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950) ................................. 22 
111 
01228102.3 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff Secured Investment Corp. ("SIC") brought a breach of contract claim against the 
Defendant, Myers Executive Building, LLC, ("Myers") which sought enforcement of an 
arbitration term of the parties' contract, or a money judgment. SIC attempted service on the 
registered agent of Myers (an administratively dissolved company) in Washington on a number 
of occasions, but suspected that Myers' agent was aware of the lawsuit and actively avoiding 
service. SIC therefore brought a motion to get permission to accomplish service by publication. 
The trial court ordered service by publication, and SIC complied with the requirements of the 
Court through publication and mailing. In an effort to "over-notice" ( and not as a substitute for 
publication and mailing of the Summons and Complaint) SIC also emailed the Myers' agent the 
Summons and Complaint at two of her known email addresses. Service through publication was 
completed, and no answer was filed within the required time, and default was entered. Myers 
thereafter filed a general appearance through its counsel, and weeks later brought a motion to set 
aside the default judgment. 
The trial court denied the motion, finding that Myers failed to demonstrate mistake, 
inadvertent surprise or excusable neglect under I.R.C.P. 60(b). The trial court also found that 
any defense based on personal jurisdiction was waived under LR. C.P. 12(b )( 6) when Myers filed 
a general appearance and responsive motion. The trial court also found that Myers' action in 
failing to file an answer and having its California attorney make a single phone call related to 
arbitration was not the result of a mistake, inadvertent surprise, or excusable neglect. The trial 
court found that a prudent person who had actual knowledge of the lawsuit would have done 
more than rely on their California attorney to call about possibly arbitrating a matter that was 
1 
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pending in an Idaho court. The trial court found that a reasonable person would have to do 
something else, something more, than simply make one phone call. Finally, the trial court found 
that Myers' delay of waiting a number of weeks before filing its motion to set aside was not 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Myers' recitation of the course of proceeding is mostly accurate. However, the Record 
does not supports Myers' claim that the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Default was set at 
"the earliest possible date that the District Court had available". See R., Pp. 53-54. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. The Parties' Agreement and Myers' Breach 
On September 7, 2011, Secured Investment Corp. ("SIC") entered into a Lender/ 
Investor Agreement with Defendant Myers Executive Building, LLC ("Myers") ("Agreement"), 
which provided that Myers would agree to indemnify and hold SIC harmless 
from and against all claims, no matter whether styled in contract or tort, damages, 
actions or other source of Liability no matter how denominated arising out of or 
connected in any manner to any transaction entered into by [Myers]. In the event 
that [SIC] is named in any such action, [Myers] agrees to assume [SIC's] defense 
and pay all legal costs and expenses associated with the action. [Myers] shall 
retain the right to retain counsel of its own choice in connection with any such 
defense and [Myers] shall be liable for the costs of any such retained counsel. 
R., Pp. 7, 15 (A Verification of Complaint was filed on January 7, 2015. R., Pp. 18-19). 
The Agreement contemplated that SIC would locate borrowers interested in investing in 
real estate, and connect them with lenders/investors who would make a decision as to whether 
they would loan them money for their proposed investment. Any and all risk associated with the 
loans and investments was placed squarely on Myers. The Agreement further provided "[Myers] 
understands that [SIC] may submit template documents for the proposed transaction, but it is 
2 
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[Myers's] responsibility to have any such documents reviewed for accuracy, completeness and 
legal compliance." The Agreement further stated that SIC was not a licensed mortgage 
originator or broker in any state, that Myers was obligated to conduct an independent review of 
any proposed transaction for compliance with local law, and that Myers assumed the risks 
associated with the transaction. R., Pp. 15, 19. 
Both Myers and SIC were sued by a borrower in Minnesota as a result of the September 
7, 2011 transaction. Myers initially denied that it would be required to pay defense costs, but 
later agreed to split the cost oflitigation and to jointly hire Minnesota attorney Christopher 
Grote. R., P. 8 (ifl 0-11 ). Mr. Grote confirmed this agreement between SIC and Myers by way 
of an April 11, 2013 letter that was mailed to both SIC and Myers. R., P. 8 (if 11). Myers was 
originally obligated to indemnify and hold SIC harmless from any and all claims arising out of or 
connected in any manner to the transaction. However, Myers disputed its obligation to 
indemnify and hold SIC harmless for the litigation, and reached an agreement of accord with SIC 
to resolve the dispute. Id. This agreement was confirmed in writing by the parties' Minnesota 
attorney, Christopher Grote, in his April 11, 2013 letter ("Accord Agreement"). Id. SIC paid all 
legal fees incurred in the defense of that litigation, but Myers failed to reimburse SIC for those 
fees it had agreed to pay. R., Pp. 8-9. 
Myers breached its agreement with SIC when it failed to pay its share oflegal expenses 
as required by the parties' Accord Agreement, and also when it failed to submit the dispute to 
arbitration upon demand. R., Pp. 2-3. SIC made multiple requests to submit the matter to 




2. Idaho Law, Forum, and Jurisdiction 
The Agreement disclosed that SIC was located in Coeur d'Alene Idaho at the bottom of 
each page, and further provided that Myers was to make payments to SIC in Idaho. R., Pp. 13-
17, 19. The Agreement further provided at Paragraph 17 as follows: 
Choice of Law and Forum. This Contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of 
Idaho without reference to its choice oflaw provisions. 
R., Pp. 16, 19. 
In addition to the above-listed facts, Myers voluntarily filed a general Notice of 
Appearance with the trial court on April 6, 2015. R., Pp. 51-52. Said Notice of Appearance did 
not include a motion under Rule 12(b) (2), (4), or (5). Id. No jurisdictional arguments or 
motions were made until April 22, 2015 when Myers filed its Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment and its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. R., Pp. 49-
50, 55-67. 
3. Attempts to Accomplish Personal Service on Myers 
Leading to SIC's Decision to Senre by Publication 
SIC and its legal counsel undertook considerable research to determine where SIC's 
agent for service of process in Washington could be served. This included Mr. Schmidt's legal 
assistant, Terri Boyd-Davis, searching the Washington Secretary of State's website for Myers' 
registered agent. The website showed that Myers was "inactive" but listed its registered agent as 
Linda Youngberg ("Youngberg") with an address of 105B W Main # 118, Puyallup, WA, 983 71 
("Registered Address"). R., Pp. 143-148, 175-176, 188. 
On December 5, 2014, Terri Boyd-Davis contacted AA Process Servers ("AA") located 
in Puyallup, Washington by email and was advised by "Yvonne" that AA could serve the 
documents immediately. Ms. Boyd-Davis requested that AA serve Youngberg at the Registered 
4 
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Address. On December 10, 2014, Yvonne sent Ms. Boyd-Davis an email and called her to 
inform Ms. Boyd-Davis that she could not locate Suite 118. She said there was no suite marked 
as #118 but one that appeared to be #118 was vacant and for lease. R., Pp. 143-147. 
Ms. Boyd-Davis conducted further research by performing Google searches and found 
another address listed in Bonney Lake, Washington. After conferring with Mr. Schmidt, they 
determined it would be appropriate to attempt service at this address as well. On December 11, 
2014, AA was instructed to attempt service at this address. R., Pp. 144, 137. 
On December 12, 2014, the AA process server left a voicernail message for Ms. Boyd-
Davis indicating the following: 
She reports that unsuccessful attempts were made at this address but they finally "got" 
someone on Thursday evening. She said it was a white male in his 20s/30s who was 
corning out of the driveway in a Jeep. There was also a big dark truck parked there. He 
claims he doesn't know Linda Youngberg and that she doesn't live there. The server was 
uncertain whether he was telling the truth or not. 
R., Pp. 137, 144-145. 
No other potential addresses for Myers or Youngberg could be uncovered through 
research, and SIC also had no known addresses for them. Therefore, no further attempts at 
service were made. R., P. 145. 
SIC's attorney, William Halls, who represents SIC in litigation in California with Myers, 
had dealt with Myers prior to that litigation. R., Pp. 149-150 (i! 3-4). As part of the California 
litigation, and before Myers was represented by counsel, Mr. Halls spoke with Linda Youngberg 
by telephone. Id. (,r 4). During that conversation, which occurred shortly after SIC had filed the 
lawsuit, Ms. Youngberg stated that she was aware ofSIC's attempts to serve her, and that she 
was going to avoid service. Id. Mr. Halls asked her how that would be helpful, and she 
responded that she just liked to "make things difficult." Id. 
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Later, when Mr. Halls heard from Mr. Schmidt that the process server in this action was 
having problems in locating Ms. Youngberg for service, Mr. Halls realized that she was engaged 
in similar tactics to those she had displayed in connection with the California litigation. Id. (,r 5). 
Based upon Mr. Halls' experience in dealing with Myers' California attorney, William Bernard, 
Mr. Halls advised Mr. Schmidt that attempting to work anything out with Mr. Bernard would be 
problematic. Id. (i-f 6). Generally speaking, such attempts on Mr. Halls' part were unsuccessful 
and were met with some sort of demand for an unwarranted concession. For instance, on one 
occasion Mr. Halls experienced a computer virus that delayed preparation of discovery 
responses. Id. When he asked for a short extension, Mr. Bernard responded that such an 
extension was acceptable but only if SIC waived any rights to object to the discovery. Id. On 
another occasion, when SIC's California attorney was injured in an accident and was unavailable 
to attend Lee Arnold's deposition, Mr. Bernard continued with the deposition despite opposing 
counsel's inability to attend. Id. (i! 7). 
After Mr. Schmidt corresponded with his client's agents and attorneys regarding Myers' 
prior conduct, they all determined that it was unlikely further efforts at service would be 
justified. The collective determination was that it would be most efficient to serve by publication 
in order to force Myers to file an Answer. R., Pp. 137 (i-f 5), 176 (i-f 11). 
4. Application to Serve by Publication, and Evidence Presented 
to Trial Court 
SIC thereafter applied for permission to obtain service by publication, and obtained 
permission from the trial court. R., Pp. 20-35. Facts set forth in the application included (1) that 
Myers was a Washington LLC; 1 (2) that Myers had listed the address of its registered agent in 
1 R., P. 7 (~ 3) (statement in Complaint); R., Pp. 18-19 (Verification of Complaint); R., P. 26 (~ 3); R., Pp. 28 (~ 2-
4), 31 (Washington Secretary of State printout showing address, agent for service of process as "Linda Youngberg" 
and "Inactive" status for Myers.) 
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the state ofWashington;2 (3) that service was attempted at the address listed with the 
Washington Secretary of State's website but was not successful;3 ( 4) that service was attempted 
at another address utilized by the registered agent on more than one occasion but was not 
successful;4 and (5) that upon further research, SIC's counsel categorically testified that "we are 
not aware of any other potential addresses where service could be effectuated" and that "serving 
the Defendant could not be completed despite due diligence."5 
5. SIC's Service by Publication 
The trial court entered its Order permitting service by publication on January 8, 2015. R., 
Pp. 34-35. On January 12, 2015, copies of the Summons and Complaint were sent via regular 
mail and certified mail return receipt requested to Myers at its last known address, and to Myers' 
registered agent, Linda Youngberg, at her last known address. R., P. 40. 
The Alias Summons was published in the Puyallup Herald four times, with the first 
publication occurring on Wednesday, January 14, 2015, and each Wednesday thereafter up until 
the fourth and final publication which occurred on Wednesday, February 4, 2015. R., P. 38. 
Service by publication was therefore completed on February 4, 2014. Id. 
6. SIC's Extra Email Notice to Myers, and Myers' Response 
SIC also provided extra notice to Myers by emailing the Summons and Complaint to two 
of Youngberg's known email addresses. The emails used for providing extra notice were 
lindayoungberg@hotmail.com and myersexecutivellc_@hotmail.com. R., Pp. 40, 42. Myers 
has admitted that it received the Summons and Complaint by email in January of 2015. R., P. 
40. 
2 R., Pp. 24, 27 (~~ 3-4), 28-29 (~~ 2-4). 
3 R., Pp. 24, 27 (~~ 3-4), 28-29 (~~ 2-4). 
4 R., Pp. 24, 27 (~ 4), 29 (~ 5). 
5 R., P. 27 (~ 4) (emphasis added). 
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On the same day the email was sent, Linda Youngberg, Myers' registered agent, 
forwarded the Complaint to her California legal counsel, William Bernard, who is not licensed to 
practice law in the state of Idaho. R., Pp. 69 (,r 3), 78. Thereafter, "Ms. Youngberg was 
informed by Mr. Bernard that service by email was not effective." Appellant's Opening Brief, 5 
(citing R., P. 78). 
Mr. Bernard admits in his Declaration that "I was not licensed to practice law in the State 
of Idaho" but that he "nevertheless asked if [Linda Youngberg] had ever been personally served 
with the summons and complaint in the Idaho action. Ms. Youngberg, responded categorically 
that neither she, nor anyone from her company, had ever been served." Id. 
On January 26, 2015, Mr. Schmidt received a voicemail left by William Bernard, the 
Myers' California attorney. The voice message that was left was of very poor quality, and Mr. 
Schmidt assumed Mr. Bernard was calling from a cell phone that was nearly out of range 
because it was crackling and randomly cutting out. Mr. Bernard did not state that he intended to 
defend the action that was filed in Idaho. His tone suggested he was annoyed, and he told Mr. 
Schmidt that litigation was already occurring in California. He also stated that he had some 
"suggestions" for Mr. Schmidt and requested that Mr. Schmidt call him back. He attempted to 
leave a phone number, but the connection cut out and his phone number could not be heard. Mr. 
Schmidt assumed Mr. Bernard would contact him again by phone, or send an email or letter. At 
some point in his voicemail he also indicated that he had received a copy of the Complaint from 
his client. Mr. Bernard did not indicate that he or his client intended to defend the action in the 
call that was received. R 138-139. 
There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Bernard contacted Mr. Schmidt and advised 
that he "intended to defend the Complaint" as Myers asserts. Myers cites to R., Pp. 69-70 in 
8 
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support of its claim that Mr. Bernard stated a clear intent to defend. Appellant's Opening Brief, 
P. 5. However, on this subject Mr. Bernard's affidavit only provides that 
The purpose of this phone call was to advise Mr. Schmidt that I was the attorney 
for MYERS in the State of California and that perhaps an open extension of time 
could be granted to respond to the outstanding complaint, or alternatively, to 
dismiss the complaint entirely, so that arbitration could proceed as it concerned 
the allegations contained within the Idaho Complaint. 
R., P. 64 (if4) (emphasis added). 
Myers' does not testify that he in fact related the information he intended to. However, 
even if we assume that the information he intended to relate was in fact communicated ( a fact 
that is disputed), Mr. Bernard's statement admits he was aware oflegal service because he 
testified he asked for an "extension." Id. One does not need an extension granted unless one has 
been served. 
Mr. Schmidt did not receive a phone call on January 27, 2015, as contended by Mr. 
Bernard. Mr. Schmidt testified in his Declaration that he contacted his client immediately after 
he reviewed the phone message to describe it to his client. Mr. Schmidt's email was sent to his 
client on January 26, 2015 at 2:31 pm. Mr. Schmidt did not receive two phone calls or messages 
from Mr. Bernard, so he is confident that he did not receive another call on January 27 as alleged 
by Mr. Bernard. R., P. 138 (ifif 7-8). 
Contrary to the Myers' speculation, SIC's agents and legal counsel worked very hard to 
find good addresses in order to accomplish personal service on Ms. Youngberg. After serving 
the man they believed to be Ms. Youngberg' s son at one of the addresses, and after hearing about 
his denial that Ms. Youngberg lived there, and also after hearing about Ms. Youngberg' s and Mr. 
Bernard's conduct in other litigation, Mr. Schmidt and his client reasonably believed that they 
were dealing with a party that was aware of the lawsuit and avoiding service - something Ms. 
9 
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Youngberg had done before just "to be difficult." They therefore elected to serve by publication. 
Service by publication against such individuals usually elicits a response from defendants who 
have been successful in evading service. It also avoids incurring unnecessary costs in fruitless 
efforts to find and serve a defendant who is aware litigation has begun and needs only to be 
served. It further prevents a last-minute dash to get service by publication before the six-month 
deadline for service runs. R., Pp. 139 (,I 9), 176 (,Ill), 150 (fl 4-6). 
Mr. Schmidt was never advised that Ms. Youngberg would be attending any depositions 
in California on March 9, 2015, and there is no evidence in the record supporting such an 
inference. However, even if Mr. Schmidt been informed of this, it would not have been 
important to him since service by publication had already been completed as of February 4, 
2015. Also, Mr. Schmidt knew that Ms. Youngberg and her attorney knew of the pendency of 
the litigation, knew they had received his office's emails forwarding the Complaint and 
Summons, and knew that Mr. Bernard was aware of this because that is what he stated had 
prompted his call and message in the first place. R., P. 139 (,I 10). 
7. The Amount Claimed in the Complaint 
As a part of SIC's Complaint in this matter, it sought $74,487.07, together with interest, 
as well as up to $15,000 in attorney fees if judgment was taken by default. R., Pp. 9 (,Il 7), 10 (,I 
25 & ,I A), 11 (,ID). 
The Judgment entered in this matter awarded SIC exactly what it requested, which was a 
"sum certain claimed, which can be by computation made certain" and was calculated6 as 
follows: 
6 R., Pp. 40-41 (~ 6). 
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a. Monetary damages equal to $74,487.07 plus additional interest at LC. § 
28-22-104 rate of 12% per annum, calculated as follows: 
1. ($74,487.07)((1/365)(.12)) = $24.4889 in interest per day from 
April 11, 2013 to March 11, 2015 (699 days). 
ii. 699 days* $24.4889/day = $17,117.74 in interest. 




















R., Pp. 40-41 (16); 47 (Default Judgment for $100,109.64). 
Contrary to Myers' assertion, SIC did not seek or obtain more monetary relief as part of 
its application for default than it stated in its Complaint. See R., Pp. 9-11, 47. SIC's Complaint 
sought entry of a monetary judgment, and in the alternative sought to compel Myers to arbitrate. 
R., Pp. 9-11. Having obtained and elected for all of the relief SIC desired (the monetary award), 
there was no need for arbitration. Additionally, the Judgment entered was not a partial default 
judgment. R., P. 47 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Should Respondents be awarded attorney fees on appeal? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
A trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,221 P.3d 81, 85 (2009); accord Idaho 
State Police v. Real Property, 144 Idaho 60, 62 (2007). "Although the court is vested with broad 
discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion is limited 
11 
01228102.3 
and may be granted only on a showing of unique and compelling circumstances justifying 
relief." Villa Highlands, LLC v. Western Comm. Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 598,602 (2010) (emphasis 
added). "A determination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to be determined 
by the trial court, whose factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous." Idaho 
State Police, 144 Idaho at 62. "Motions to set aside a judgment are governed by equitable 
principles and will only be granted in the most unusual of circumstances." Flood v. Katz, 143 
Idaho 454,457 (2006) (emphasis added); accord Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 
127 (2nd Cir. 2009) (declining relief on the basis of unclean hands); Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2857. "The rule attempts to strike a proper balance between 
the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be 
done." Id. 
With respect to requests for relief from entry of a default judgment, "[ d]iscretionary relief 
is permitted, under subsection (b)(l), for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," 
while "relief from a void judgment pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) is nondiscretionary such that the 
appellate court may exercise free review on appeal. Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 
647, 991 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted). "In order for a judgment to 
be considered "void" under Rule 60(b )( 4), there generally must have been some jurisdictional 
defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, because the court lacked either personal 
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction." Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991 
P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1998). 
In the present case, Myers "is incorrect" to argue "that a failure to deliver three-day 
notice renders a judgment void, rather than merely voidable." Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 
288,221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009) (emphasis added). When a judgment is voidable, "[t]he district 
12 
01228102.3 
court generally has discretion whether to vacate a default judgment under I.R.C.P. 55( c )." Id. In 
this case, the issue is whether Myers "appeared in the action" when its California attorney left a 
telephone message with SIC's attorney. Thus, the proper standard ofreview is discretionary, and 
this Court should not disturb the trial court's ruling absent a showing of an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho 198,200, 795 P.2d 903,905 (Ct. App. 1990) 
Under Rule 60(b), "[t]he party moving to set aside a default judgment must not only meet 
the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b ), but must also plead facts which, if established, would 
constitute a defense to the action." Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 38, 720 P .2d 217, 221 (Ct. 
App. 1986). The "facts" must be more than mere legal conclusions. Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 
96 Idaho 341, 344 528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974). 
It was Myers' burden as the moving party to establish the above-listed criteria. The trial 
court weighed the evidence presented, specifically found that Myers did not meet its burden, and 
held that the judgment should not be set aside. Tr. P. 36-41. This Court should uphold the trial 
court's ruling and deny Myers' appeal. 
B. The District Court did not error by refusing to set aside the Default 
Judgment pursuant to IRCP 60(b) (4) because the Judgment was not "void.". 
"A void judgment is a ground for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). However, 'in order for a 
judgment to be void, there generally must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to 
enter the judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, l 05 Idaho 302, 306 (1983) 
( citing 7 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.25[2] (2d ed. 1975);" First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 98 
Idaho 598, 605 at n. 4, 570 P.2d 276,283 at n. 4 (1977). 
Myers sets forth three arguments as to why the judgment is void: (1) SIC failed to give 
three days' notice before seeking default, (2) the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction, and 
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(3) Myers was not properly served. As is set forth in detail below, each of these arguments is 
without merit. First, SIC was not required to give three days notice because Myers did not 
appear in the action. Second, the subject of personal jurisdiction was waived when Myers filed a 
voluntary general appearance and failed to simultaneously contest jurisdiction of the District 
Court. Third, Myers was properly served by publication, and also received actual notice of the 
pendence of the suit. Therefore, Myers has not established that he was entitled to relief from the 
judgment and order of the court on the ground that the judgment was void. 
1. Myers did not "appear" in the action based on a single telephone 
message, and was therefore not entitled to three-days' written notice 
of SIC's intent to take a default. 
Myers has cited to the case of Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho 198 (Ct. App. 1990) for the 
proposition that a default entered without three-days' written notice violates due process. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, Pp. 9, 10. Myers' reliance on Nickels is misplaced because the 
Nickels decision favors SIC's position, not Myers'. In Nickels, the defendant against whom a 
default was entered argued that because it had a separate action pending concerning the same 
transaction in Utah, that its dispute of the claim there demonstrated its intent to defend in Idaho. 
In rejecting this argument, the Nickels7 Court explained: 
As is apparent from the rule, a prerequisite to the three-day notice is an 
appearance in the action by the party against whom judgment by default is sought. 
In Idaho this appearance is not limited to a formal court appearance. The term has 
been more broadly defined by Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 672 P.2d 231 
(1983). In Newbold the defendant visited the plaintiffs attorney at his office and 
later attended a deposition. Plaintiffs attorney at the deposition acknowledged 
that defendant was representing himself. Our Supreme Court held that these facts 
were sufficient to show an appearance for the purposes of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). 
Essentially, the Court has held that "conduct on the part of the defendant which 
indicates an intent to defend against the action can constitute an appearance 
within the meaning of the rule." Catledge v. Transport Tire Company, Inc., l 07 
Idaho 602,606, 69i P.2d i2i7, i221 (1984) (citing Newbold). 




Durbano asks this Court to take the "intent to defend" statement in Newbold and 
Catledge a step further. He argues that by filing the action in Utah to enforce the 
sale contract he clearly has indicated his intention to defend against any claim that 
Nickels had as a result of the transaction. He notes that the parties were actively 
litigating the case in Utah-albeit over the threshold question of jurisdiction-when 
his default was taken in Idaho for failing to appear in this action. 
We have found no case holding that, where each party to a disputed transaction 
has filed his own action against the other, in separate courts, one party's pursuit of 
his own action wiil constitute "conduct" indicating an intent to defend against the 
adversary's action so that for the purpose of Rule 55(b )(2) it can be said an 
"appearance" has been made in the adversary's action. 
In addition to the Newbold, Catledge, and Collex cases, Durbano relies on HF. 
Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689 
(D.C.Cir.1970) (cited in Newbold) and Charlton L. Davis & Co. P.C. v. Fedder 
Data Center, 556 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.1977). In each of these cases, however, the 
defaulted party had engaged in some activity in the action in which the default 
judgment was obtained. 
In each of the cases we have examined, some correspondence, participation in 
proceedings, or discussions acknowledging the existence of a pending legal 
action which indicate an intent to defend are central to a holding that an 
appearance has been made in the action. Other courts hold that "(a)n 
appearance in an action involves some submission or presentation to the 
court by which a party shows his intention to submit himself to the 
jurisdiction of the court." US. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 
P.2d 121, 124 (Wyo.1983). Accord, Patterson v. Rockwell International, 665 
S.W.2d 96 (Tenn.1984) (defendant's conduct must imply a general appearance, 
not just one contesting only jurisdiction). See also R.F. v. D. G. W., 192 Colo. 528, 
560 P.2d 837 (1977) (defendant's conduct must be sufficient to indicate to the trial 
court an interest in defending on the merits of the action). 
In the present case, Nickels' counsel concedes that before Durbano commenced 
the litigation he had discussions with Durbano's counsel regarding settlement of 
the underlying dispute. These discussions occurred from October 1987 until 
March 1988. Durbano's Utah counsel, in an affidavit, states that the discussions 
between counsel also occurred after Durbano was served with process in the 
Idaho action, leading to an "understanding" that the question of jurisdiction would 
be determined in the Utah court before any action would be necessary in the Idaho 
case. Durbano's counsel produced no records or notations of any such calls. 
Nickels' counsel adamantly denied that any such conversations or other direct 
communication had occurred between the filing of the Idaho action and the entry 
of the default judgment. His affidavit was specific. Durbano had the burden of 
persuasion on this point. Although the district judge did not specifically address 
this issue of fact, the judge did find that "the defendants were aware of the 
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Idaho action and did nothing in regard to the Idaho action prior to the entry 
of the default judgment." We are satisfied that the record supports this finding 
and we will defer to it. 
Id. at 201-203 (emphasis added). 
The cases cited by Myers would never support Myers' contention that leaving a 
voicemail would constitute a clear statement of intent to defend. All of the cases8 dealing with 
the issue required significant correspondence or "contacts demonstrating a clear purpose to 
defend." In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875 (C.A.9 1993). Further, it is illogical that Myers 
would state an intent to defend in Idaho and ask for an extension to file an answer, where at the 
same time it contests both long-arm jurisdiction and asserts that Idaho does not have personal 
jurisdiction based on inadequate service. This is because the clear statement of an intent to 
defend must be one "by which a party shows his intention to submit himself to the 
jurisdiction of the court." Nickels at 203. ( emphasis added). 
In the present case, we have Myers' California attorney claiming that he stated an intent 
to defend in a single voicemail allegedly left on January 27, 2015. However, no such voicemail 
8 Other cases cited by Defendant included: Knight Ins., Inc. 109 Idaho at 59: (withdrawing 
attorney's failure to give client proper notice of withdrawal per Rule l l(b)(3) justified setting 
default aside; holding was not based on IRCP Rule 55(b)(2)'s three-day notice requirement); 
Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho 198 (Ct. App. 1990) (court rejected argument of defaulted 
defendant that parallel litigation in Utah and correspondence over dispute constituted notice of 
intent to defend in Idaho action; disagreement over merits does not constitute notice of intent to 
defend; cited several cases for proposition that real and meaningful involvement in the particular 
case where default was obtained is required); Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho 57 (1983) (after 
defendant had appeared, and plaintiff amended the complaint, defendant's failure to file an 
answer to the amended complaint within ten days per Rule 15(a) still required that plaintiff give 
three-days' notice prior to seeking default under Rule 55(b)(2)); Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 
Idaho 663 (1983) (where a prose defendant had visited plaintiffs attorney in his office, 
attended a deposition, and stated on the record during the deposition that he was representing 
himself, defendant was entitled to three-days' notice.); H.F. Livermore Corp. v. 
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689 (1970) (nine months of written 
correspondence documenting dispute and intent of defendant to defend was sufficient to entitle 
defendant to three-days' notice). 
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was received on that date. R., P. 138 (,i,r 7-8). SIC has introduced evidence (based on Michael 
Schmidt's own recollection and an email he sent to his clients on January 26, 2015 concerning 
the message that was left) that while he did get a voicemail from Mr. Bernard,9 that voicemail 
was reviewed a full day prior to Mr. Bernard's alleged voicemail. R., P. 138 (i!i! 7-8). The 
voicemail that Mr. Schmidt received was over a poor connection, and sounded like Mr. Bernard 
intended to lecture him on a number of non-specific "suggestions." Id. In the voicemail, there 
was never any clear statement of an intent to defend. Id. At most, it sounded like Mr. Bernard 
was annoyed, and wanted to relate that annoyance to Mr. Schmidt in person. Id. Based upon 
recommendations from SIC, SIC's local transactional counsel, and SIC's California counsel, Mr. 
Schmidt did not return Mr. Bernard's call but simply waited for an Answer to be filed by an 
Idaho attorney. R., P. 150 (i! 6). Mr. Bernard did try to leave a contact number to return Mr. 
Bernard's call, but like the rest of the call, it was broken up and the phone number could not be 
deciphered. R., P. 138 (i! 7). 
Myers did not state a clear intent to defend in its counsel's single voicemail to Mr. 
Schmidt, but even ifhe had, that minimal effort is not sufficient for purposes of entitling Myers 
to a three-day notice. It is not difficult to imagine the problems that would arise if this Court 
were to hold that a single telephone message of disputed content could serve as an "appearance" 
for purposes of Rule 55(b )(2). From a public policy perspective, if a defendant wants three days' 
notice before having a default entered, the defendant needs to clearly and unequivocally submit 
to the jurisdiction of the court, or at a minimum, state its intent to defend in writing or on the 
record. 
9 Myers asserts on page 11 of Appellant's Opening Brief that "The telephone call from Mr. 
Bernard to Mr. Schmidt is not in dispute." Id. That statement is not accurate. While it is true 
the existence of the call is not in dispute, the date of the call and the contents of the message are 
clearly disputed. R., P. 138 (if7-8). 
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Myers argues on the one hand that it "appeared" in the action thus entitling it to the three-
day noticing requirement of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), but on the other hand has denied that Idaho has 
personal jurisdiction over it. Myers' positions are entirely inconsistent with a true "appearance." 
Likewise, Mr. Bernard stated as part of his Declaration that he was seeking "an open extension 
ohime ... to respond to the outstanding complaint." R., P. 69. Myers is again inconsistent with 
its arguments, as Myers would not need an "extension" of time if it contested jurisdiction or 
service of process. 
Myers has not established that it was entitled to relief from the judgment and order of the 
court on the ground that the judgment was void. Accordingly, SIC requests that Myers' appeal 
be denied. 
2. The Default Judgment is not Void because the District Court has 
Personal Jurisdiction over Myers. 
"If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must keep out for 
all purposes except to make that objection." Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319,320, 193 
P.3d 866, 867 (2008) (quoting Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v. Charles J. Webb & Co., 36 Idaho 442, 
446 (1922)). "The filing of a notice of appearance by a party is equivalent to the service of 
process upon that party." Engleman v. Milanez, 137 Idaho 83, 84 (2002). 
In Engleman, the defendant's attorney filed a notice of appearance, and stated that he 
"hereby reserves all objections and defenses" including Rule 12(b) defenses. Id. On appeal, the 
Engleman Court explained, "In this case, defendants' counsel filed a notice of appearance on 
May 8, 2000. That notice of appearance was not a motion under Rule 12(b) (2), (4), or (5), and 
therefore the filing of the notice constituted a voluntary appearance by the defendants in this 
action." Id. at 85. 
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Jurisdiction over Myers has been established because Myers filed a general appearance 
on April 6, 2015, and did not file a simultaneous motion under Rule 12(b) (2), (4), or (5) in 
connection with the appearance. R., Pp. 51-52. When Myers filed its general appearance, it 
submitted for all purposes to the jurisdiction of the trial court, and therefore any retroactive 
decisions related to the default judgment would become binding upon it once made. Myers was 
free to argue that service of process was defective, and that this was relevant to its mistake, 
surprise or excusable neglect arguments under I.R.P.C. 60(b)(l). However, after the trial court 
found that Myers did not meet its burden of persuasion on its motion to set aside, Myers cannot 
retroactively retract its submission to the jurisdiction of the court and maintain that everything 
remains "void" for want of personal jurisdiction. 
Myers has not established that he was entitled to relief from the judgment and order of 
the court on the ground that the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, SIC requests that Myers' appeal be denied. 
3. SIC accomplished service on Myers through publication, and 
even provided additional notice to Myers of the pendency of 
the lawsuit. 
Myers has argued that SIC failed to properly serve Myers because SIC's affidavits "were 
defective" and that "the affidavits did not set forth that Myers does not have a business agent, 
manager or cashier that could be found within Idaho" and that "[s]uch a statement is required 
under Idaho Code§ 5-508." Appellant's Opening Brief, 14. Myers argument lacks merit because 
the application met at least three of the alternative grounds for permitting service by publication. 
Further, Myers fails to cite any authority for the proposition that the service by publication is 
rendered "ineffective" once ordered by the trial court. 
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First, Idaho Code § 5-508 sets forth a number of alternative factual situations under 
which service by publication is authorized, and it is not required that in all instances the affidavit 
include a statement about whether a business agent, manager or cashier could be found in Idaho. 
Idaho Code § 5-508 provides in relevant part: 
When the person on whom the service is to be made resides outside of the state, 
m: has departed from the state, Q! cannot after due diligence be found within the 
state, Q! conceals himself therein to avoid the service of summons, Q! is a foreign 
corporation having no managing or business agent, cashier or secretary within this 
state, . . . and such facts appear by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court in 
which the suit is pending ... the court may make an order for the publication of 
the summons; and an affidavit setting forth in ordinary and concise language any 
of the grounds as above set forth, upon which the publication of the summons is 
sought, shall be sufficient without setting forth or showing what efforts have 
been made or what diligence has been exerted in attempting to find the 
defendant. 
Idaho Code§ 5-508 ( emphasis added). 
Facts set forth in the affidavits filed in support of SI C's application included ample 
evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the person on whom the service is to be 
made resides outside of the state because the only addresses they found for both Myers and Linda 
Youngberg were in Washington, and she could not be located there after numerous attempts to 
serve her. R., Pp. 26-27. Further, she could not "after due diligence be found within the state" 
because she could not be found at all, meaning she could not be found in any location, which 
would obviously include Idaho. Id. SIC also demonstrated that Myers was a foreign corporation 
having no managing or business agent, cashier or secretary within this state because SIC's 
counsel categorically testified that "we are not aware of any other potential addresses where 
service could be effectuated" and that "serving the Defendant could not be completed despite due 
diligence." R., Pp. 26-27 (emphasis added). 
SIC met at least three of the alternative grounds, and is not required to specifically use 
the terms "business agents, managers or cashiers" in all instances before obtaining authorization 
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to serve by publication. Additionally, Myers presents no authority in support of its position that 
a defect in the application for permission to accomplish service by publication would void the 
order and subsequent service. 
It is worth noting that Ms. Youngberg does not state in her Declaration that she was 
present or living at the address that is listed for Myers with the Washington Secretary of State. 
The only evidence in the record is that when SIC's process server attempted service at the 
address, "she could not locate Suite 118. She said there was no suite marked as #118 but one that 
appeared to be #118 was vacant and for lease." R., P. 144. See also, R., P. 24 (process server's 
testimony that "There is no suite # 118 or anyone named Linda Youngberg associated with that 
address"). 
Ms. Youngberg also never claims that she was unaware that Myers was being served by 
publication. R., Pp. 75-79. The same is true with respect to Mr. Bernard- there is no testimony 
that he was unaware that service by publication was being pursued. R., Pp. 69-71. The evidence 
presented to the trial court strongly suggests that they want the Court to believe this, but there is 
no evidence this was the case. During oral argument, the trial court questioned Myers' counsel 
"so they can't argue that they didn't know. They can argue that service wasn't proper," to which 
Myers counsel responded "Correct." Tr. P. 10, 11. 17-20. Yet Myers' counsel went on to assert 
"Nobody knew that publication had been made. I mean, if a publication had been made and 
somebody knew about it, they would have probably filed an answer." Tr., P. 11, LL 6-9. Neither 
Mr. Bernard nor Ms. Youngberg testified that they did not know service of process by 
publication was occurring. 
The Summons and Complaint were provided by certified and regular mail to the last 
known addresses of Myers' agent, as well as by email. R., P. 40. SIC went the extra mile in 
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sending these documents by email to two known addresses of Linda Youngberg's. Id. The 
emails were not an attempt to "serve" Myers by email as it tries characterize it. Instead, service 
by email was an attempt to "over-notice" and give Myers every opportunity to defend and file an 
answer. This was done out of recognition that service by publication is not perfect, but under the 
circumstances ( avoiding service, not appointing a registered agent living in Washington or Idaho 
to accept service, denying demands to arbitrate, demonstrating uncooperativeness in California 
litigation, avoiding service in the California lawsuit, etc.), the notice by publication, regular mail, 
certified mail, and email, was more than adequate to apprise Myers of the pendency of the 
lawsuit, and to give Myers an opportunity to defend. 
"[D]ue process requirements are satisfied if the notice given is 'reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections."' Evans v. Galloway, 108 Idaho 711, 712, 
(1985) (quoting, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950). 
Under the circumstances of this case, the publication, certified mail, regular mail, and email that 
was received was not only reasonably calculated to apprise Myers of the pendency of the action 
and afford it an opportunity to respond, it in fact acknowledged receipt of the email, the 
pendency of the action, and allegedly requested an "extension" to file a response. R., P. 69 (i! 4). 
Myers has not established that it was entitled to relief from the judgment and order of the 
court on the ground that the judgment was void due to improper service. Accordingly, SIC 
requests that Myers' appeal be denied. 
22 
01228102.3 
C. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by not setting aside the 
Default Judgment due to mistake, surprise or excusable neglect under IRCP 
60(b)(l). 
"Rule 60(b )(1) states that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The decision whether to grant relief under 
the rule is committed to the discretion of the trial court." Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. 
Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913, 915 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing, Schraufaagel v. 
Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 754 (Ct. App. 1987). In Shelton v. Diamond Int'! Corp., 108 Idaho 
935,938, (1985), the Shelton Court adopted the current standard for review of motions to set 
aside default judgments as follows: 
When we review, on appeal, the trial court's application oflaw to the facts found, we will 
consider whether appropriate criteria were applied and whether the result is one that 
logically follows. Thus, if ( a) the trial court makes findings of fact which are not clearly 
erroneous, (b) the court applies to those facts the proper criteria under Rule 60(b )( 1) 
( tempered by the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases), and ( c) the trial court's decision 
follows logically from application of such criteria to the facts found, then the court will 
be deemed to have acted within its sound discretion. Its decision will not be overturned 
on appeal. 
Id. (quoting, Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321,325 (Ct.App.1983). 
In the LR.P.C. Rule 60(b)(l) context, the term "Surprise" "is generally defined to 
be 'some condition or situation in which a party to an action is unexpectedly placed to his 
injury, without any default or negligence of his own, and which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against." Nickels at 908. Interestingly, Plaintiff has not argued that 
there was any "mistake" or inadvertence, but instead focuses exclusively on the 
excusable neglect element of I.R.C.P. 60(b )(1 ). "In determining whether a party's 
conduct constitutes excusable neglect, the courts must consider each case in light of its 
unique facts." Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Avondale, 104 
Idaho at 326). The relevant question before this Court is whether Myers' conduct in 
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allowing the default to be entered constitutes excusable neglect. Olson v. Kirkham, 111 
Idaho 34, 38 (Ct. App. 1986). "Under Rule 60(b) excusable neglect is conduct that might 
be expected of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances." Olson at 38. 
Myers' California counsel in his affidavit in support of the motion to set aside the default, 
asserts that on January 12, 2015, he "received communication from my client advising that a 
lawsuit against it had been filed in the state ofldaho." R., P. 69 (,I 3). This was the same day 
that Myers counsel mailed and emailed Ms. Youngberg a copy of the Summons and Complaint 
to her two known email addresses (linda _youngberg@hotmail.com and 
myersexecutivellc_@hotmail.com). R., P. 138 (,r 7). Myers' counsel advised her he could not 
represent her. Id. He then asked if she had received anything by mail, which she indicated she 
had not. Id. Because everything had been sent out that same day, any physical mailings would 
have been en route to Myers' two known addresses, and could not possibly have been received. 
Prior to entry of default, Myers' California counsel told Ms. Youngberg that he would 
"contact SIC's Idaho counsel and could handle the arbitration." R., P. 78 (,I 13). He did not state 
that he would appear, file an answer, or otherwise represent Myers, and Myers has not indicated 
that she relied on him to handle the pending litigation. And in fact, even if she had relied, her 
reliance would not have been reasonable given the fact that Myers' California counsel 
affirmatively told her that he could not represent Myers in Idaho. R., P. 78 (,I 12). There is also 
nothing in the record to indicate that Myers' counsel stated he would seek to locate or hire Idaho 
counsel, and Myers does not claim it was relying on him to do so. The record demonstrates that 
Myers knew it was unrepresented in Idaho, and elected not to hire Idaho counsel to advise her 
with respect to what needed to occur in order to protect her interests in Idaho. Thereafter, 
Myers' California counsel testified that he called SIC's counsel for the purpose of seeking an 
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extension of time to respond to the outstanding complaint, or alternatively, to dismiss the 
complaint entirely so that arbitration could proceed. R., P. 69 (i! 4). There is no indication that 
Myers or SIC's California Counsel did anything further after that. There is no testimony 
concerning what they knew or did not know at any given time. They do not testify that they were 
unaware of the pending service by publication, and they do not testify that they were unaware 
that Plaintiffs were seeking a default judgment. There is no testimony of any "mistake" or a 
"situation in which a party to an action is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default 
or negligence of his own, and which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." A 
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances would have hired Idaho counsel to 
monitor the lawsuit and respond to the Complaint. Because it is Myers' burden to demonstrate 
excusable neglect, Myers' failure to allege these facts is fatal to its argument. 
In Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 38 (Ct. App. 1986), a defaulted defendant argued that 
its neglect was excusable because it had relied on its attorney to contact the plaintiff "in regard to 
previous settlement offers and to ascertain whether or not plaintiff intended to commence 
probate proceedings" which the defendant's counsel believed to be a legal requirement. Id. The 
Olson Court held that this was not enough to constitute excusable neglect, because "the assertion 
that Olson must first go through probate proceedings does not set forth an excuse or justification 
for allowing a default judgment." Id. The Olson Court held that this conduct on the part of the 
defendant and its counsel was inadequate to show excusable neglect. Such conduct, addressed 
solely to an argument as to a belief that the complaint was premature or improper demonstrated 
conduct that "was not that which might be expected of a reasonably prudent person under the 
same circumstances." Id. 
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In the present case, like Olson, we have Myers' California counsel stating that he would 
not represent Myers in Idaho, but he would call about handling arbitration because he thought 
that was the proper way to handle the dispute. Such an argument has expressly been rejected in 
Idaho. Reasonable conduct would be to hire an Idaho attorney to address the filed complaint 
Additionally, this State maintains listings of docket entry in its online Idaho Repository, 
which indicated that at the time the Complaint and Summons were mailed and emailed to Myers 
that service by publication had begun. The Repository also eventually provided notice that the 
publication had been completed, and later that a default was being sought. Given that Myers 
knew of the pendency of the action, and its California Counsel had on January 27, 2015 
"obtain[ed] and review[ed] a copy of the Idaho Complaint online," it had all the notice it needed 
to monitor the matter. R. 69 (14). Myers has not alleged that it was relying on its California 
counsel to monitor the matter or file an Answer, or that it mistakenly believed he would monitor 
it, hire counsel, or respond to the Complaint. Myers' failure to monitor the matter and prevent 
default from being entered cannot be said to be excusable neglect under the circumstances of this 
case. 
In Danz v. Lockhart, 132 Idaho 113 (Ct. App. 1998), the court considered similar 
arguments. In rejecting the defendant's request to set a default judgment aside, the Danz Court 
explained: 
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Lockhart asserted excusable neglect under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) as the justification for 
relief from the default judgment. The question as to whether Lockhart's conduct in 
allowing the default to be entered constituted excusable neglect, is a factual issue. 
It is to be answered by considering "whether the litigant engaged in conduct 
which, although constituting neglect, was nevertheless excusable because a 
reasonably prudent person might have done the same thing under the 
circumstances." 
Lockhart argues that his failure to respond to Danz's complaint is excusable 
because he did not see the notice published in the newspaper and had no actual 
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notice of the lawsuit. The trial court found, however, that it was reasonable to 
infer from the evidence that Lockhart was aware of the proceedings and had 
willfully avoided service. 
The evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to Lockhart's motion 
reasonably permits the inference, drawn by the district court, that Lockhart was 
aware of the litigation and consciously frustrated Danz's efforts at service. 
Id. at 115-116 (some internal citations omitted). The Court then likened the case to the case of 
Rodell v. Nelson, 113 Idaho, 945 (Ct. App. 1988), wherein the defendant received a certified 
mailing but it went unclaimed, and where the process server was attacked by dogs. The Danz 
Court found similarities in the conduct, and explained: 
"It is a well-settled general principle that a person has no right to shut his eyes or 
ears to information and then to say that he lacked notice of the avoided facts. As a 
corollary to that principle, a person may not avoid the effect of a written notice by 
refusing service of the notice."10 
The district court's finding that Lockhart was aware of the pending lawsuit is not 
clearly erroneous, but even if Lockhart lacked actual knowledge of the 
proceeding, the evidence indicates that his ignorance was the product of his own 
willful avoidance of notice. The district court was justified in finding that 
Lockhart's conduct was not that of a reasonably prudent person in like 
circumstances and that Lockhart's failure to respond to Danz's complaint therefore 
did not fall within the bounds of excusable neglect. It follows that the district 
court's denial of Lockhart's motion for relief from the judgment was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
Id. at 116. 
The present case is similar to Danz and Rodell. Here there is no indication that the 
service by publication was improper, that publication did not occur, that copies of the Summons 
and Complaint were not properly mailed, or that the email containing the Summons and 
Complaint was not sent. And in fact, Myers acknowledges receipt of both by email. Further, 
Myers had previously refused demands for arbitration under the Agreement, has engaged in a 
10 Quoting Rodell v. Nelson, at 947. 
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pattern of delay and avoided service just "to be difficult," and facts presented indicated that she 
was doing the same in the present lawsuit. 
After receiving the lawsuit, she contacted her California attorney, who advised her that 
"he could not represent Myers in Idaho because he was not licensed in Idaho." R., P. 78 ( 1 13). 
Yet her California counsel advised her that "emailing the Complaint is not a recognized method 
of service under Idaho law." R., P. 78 (-if 13). 
Myers' actions in this case were unreasonable, and their neglect cannot be said to have 
been "excusable." The evidence before this Court indicates that Myers and its California counsel 
made a calculated decision to ignore the lawsuit, not research its status, and to delay and engage 
in obstructive conduct just as they did when they were demanded to participate in arbitration and 
they refused the demand, and just as they did when Defendant avoided service in California to 
"make things difficult." 
Finally, we have no explanation as to why an answer was not filed. Myers does not argue 
that it was relying on its counsel to file an Answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint. 
Myers also does not argue or present any evidence that it was unaware that service by 
publication was being undertaken by SIC. The evidence before the trial court was that Myers' 
agent was avoiding process, was aware of the Complaint, and had contacted an attorney who 
stated he could not and would not represent Myers in the Idaho litigation. The same attorney 
also allegedly requested "an extension" to respond to the Complaint. Nowhere in the record is 
there a statement that "Myers did not file an Answer because ... " Without that explanation, 
Myers cannot meet its burden of establishing that its conduct and neglect was excusable. 
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Myers has not established that it was entitled to relief from the judgment and order of the 
court on the ground of excusable neglect or mistake. Accordingly, SIC requests that Myers' 
appeal be denied. 
D. The District Court's finding that Myers waited an unreasonable time before 
moving to set the default judgment aside is not clearly erroneous, and as 
such, its decision to deny Myers' motion to set aside should be upheld. 
In connection with a motion to set aside a default judgment, a party must demonstrate 
that it was diligent in seeking to set aside a default judgment in order to establish its conduct was 
reasonable and prudent. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,291 (2009). "A party challenging a 
default judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b )(5) must do so 'within a reasonable time."' Id. "Whether 
a motion under Rule 60(b) is timely is an issue of fact for the district court. The district court's 
determination is subject to clear-error review." Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,291, (2009). 
On appeal, the Court must "defer to the trial court's findings on that issue unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Viafax v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 72 (Ct. App. 2000); Shelton v. Diamond 
Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 937 (1985). The Court must also "examine[] the length of time 
between the moment the judgment becomes apparent to the defendant and the date the Rule 
60(b) motion is filed. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,291, (2009); Via/ax v. Stuckenbrock, 
134 Idaho 65, 72 (Ct. App. 2000). Further, even where a defaulted party can show that a default 
judgment was acquired through surprise or excusable neglect, a district court's finding that the 
movant' s delay was unreasonable constitutes a proper grounds for refusing to set a default aside. 
Viafax at 71. 
In the present case, the trial court not only found that Myers' conduct was unreasonable 
under the circumstances and did not constitute mistake, inadvertent surprise or excusable neglect, 
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but it also made an independent but related finding that under the circumstances, its delay in 
moving to set the default judgment aside was unreasonable, stating: 
The Court finds even when the defendant entered its formal notice of appearance 
three weeks after the default judgment ... it still waited another sixteen days to file 
its motion to set aside the default in this matter. 
Tr. P. 40-41, LI. 25-5. 
The trial court properly considered all of Myers' conduct that precipitated entry of 
default, and also considered its conduct after default had been entered. It found the conduct 
before default to be unreasonable under the circumstances, and the subsequent delay to also be 
unreasonable. This finding was discretionary on the part of the district court, and its denial of 
the motion to set aside the default judgment should not be set aside. 
E. Myers failed to demonstrate that it possesses a meritorious defense. 
It is firmly established in Idaho that a party must demonstrate a meritorious defense 
before a default judgment will be set aside. Idaho State Police v. Real Property, 144 Idaho 60, 62 
(2007). In the oft-cited case defining this obligation, the Supreme Court noted: 
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not only 
meet the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b) but must also plead facts which, if 
established, would constitute a defense to the action. It would be an idle exercise 
for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real justiciable controversy. 
The defense matters must be detailed. 
Once a default has been entered the pleading of a defensive matter must go 
beyond the mere notice requirements that would be sufficient if pied before 
default. Factual details must be pied with particularity. 
Hearst Corp., v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 12 (1979). "This policy recognizes that it would be an 
idle exercise and a waste of judicial resources for a court to set aside a judgment if, in fact, there 
is no genuine justiciable controversy." Maynard v. Nguyen, 2011 WL 3904099 (2011). 
"Consequently, where no meritorious defense is shown in support of a motion to set aside a 
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default, a court does not abuse its discretion in denying the motion." Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 
549,224 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2010). 
"The meritorious defense requirement is a pleading requirement, not a burden of proof." 
Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 63 ( emphasis added). "Plead" is defined as "to assert or allege 
in a pleading." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 940 (7th ed. 2000). Lest it be forgotten, Rule 7(a), 
I.R.C.P., defines what constitutes a pleading in Idaho. Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319, 
321 (2008). Specifically, it provides: 
Id. 
There shall be a complaint and an answer; and there shall be a reply to a 
counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer 
contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an 
original party is summoned under Rule 14 and there shall be a third-party answer, 
if a third-party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except 
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer. 
The situation at hand is akin to that presented in Idaho State Police v. Rela Property 
Situated in County ofCasia, 144 Idaho 60, 63 (2007). In that case, the defendant sought to set 
aside a default judgment entered in a civil forfeiture action. Id. While analyzing the defendant's 
potential defense, the Court noted "[she] argues that she was an innocent owner, but she did not 
submit a pleading controverting the respondent's claims or setting forth this defense." Id. 
(emphasis added). The Court noted that "once default was entered ... [the Defendant] did not 
present a pleading alleging facts constituting a meritorious defense." Id. As a result, the Idaho 
State Police Court concluded that the trial court was correct in denying relief on the basis that the 
defendant failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense due to her failure to submit a pleading 
challenging the state's allegations. Id., at 64. 
:Myers' position also finds support in Bach v. Afiller. 148 Idaho 549 (2010). In that case, 
the defendants moved to set aside entry of default after their answer had been properly stricken. 
31 
012281023 
Id., at 1140. In support, they submitted an affidavit which contained no facts demonstrating a 
meritorious defense. Id., at 1142. On appeal, the defendants attempted to argue that the 
allegations set forth in their answer were sufficient. Id. Because the defendants' answer had 
been stricken, the Supreme Court noted that it "could not properly be considered by the district 
court in ruling on the motion." Id. Further, it pointed out that "a party may not rely on an 
ordinary pleading to prove a meritorious defense." Id. Accordingly, the court held that the 
defendants had failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense. 
Even ifwe assume that Youngberg's declaration qualifies as the pleading of her answer, 
the conclusory and non-specific assertions are not sufficient for purposes of setting aside a 
default judgment. Her declaration provides only that "Myers disputed that there was any 
agreement to pay any of the attorneys' fees and/or costs incurred by SIC and/or billed by L&V, 
and disputes the amount claimed by SIC." This assertion would not suffice even under ordinary 
pleading requirements, and fails completely to plead and set forth the "factual basis" for these 
assertions "with particularity." 
Myers' only recognizable defenses are (1) that the Judgment exceeds the amount sought 
in the complaint (it does not), and (2) that because the Agreement allegedly led to litigation with 
the borrower due to an alleged and non-specific "violation of Minnesota law," the hold harmless 
provision becomes enforceable. However, as was made clear in eight separate paragraphs of the 
Agreement itself, it was up to Myers to evaluate the legality of the Agreement under local law, to 
have its own attorney review it, that it was Myers' "responsibility to have any such documents 
reviewed for accuracy, completeness and legal compliance," and that SIC "will not conduct any 
independent review or verification of the transaction and makes no representations or warranties 
as to the merits of the transaction." R. 7, 14 (15). Further, Myers has not raised any defense 
32 
01228102.3 
with respect to the Accord Agreement to pay half of the fees incurred, which it also breached. R., 
P. 4, (,r 15-17). As a result of Myers' failure and refusal to satisfy the Accord Agreement to pay 
half of the fees, SIC sought enforcement of Myers' original duty under the original Agreement, 
which required that it indemnify and hold SIC harmless from any and all claims arising out of or 
connected in any manner to any transaction entered into by Myers. R., Pp. 2, 13-17. 
Myers now argues, by legal conclusion only, that the Minnesota litigation is the "fault" of 
SIC because the documents and transaction violated Minnesota law. Myers does not even 
indicate whether the courts in that matter found that there was a violation of Minnesota law, and 
if so, who bore responsibility for the violation, if anybody. Myers also fails to explain how a 
violation of Minnesota law would excuse Myers from its obligation to hold SIC harmless and 
indemnify it from the claims brought against both by the borrower in Minnesota. That was 
clearly their agreement, it was the risk voluntarily assumed by Myers, and no defenses, legal 
theories, or logic were offered in support of its defenses. What occurred was exactly what the 
parties had contemplated might occur - they were sued by a borrower. 
Such a conclusory argument is not an adequate "meritorious defense" to defend Myers 
from its obligation to pay legal expenses as called for by the underlying Agreement. The 
Agreement could not be any clearer when it comes to whom was assuming the risk and 
responsibility for the legality of the transaction documents, and who would pay defense costs in 
the event there was litigation. If an affirmative defense exists that makes these provisions 
unenforceable, that needed to be set forth and factually pied with particularity as part of Myers' 
motion. As such, there are no facts before this Court demonstrating that the Defendant possesses 
a meritorious defense. While the District Court did not base its decision on Myers' failure to 
plead a meritorious defense, "[ w ]here an order of a lower court is correct, but based upon an 
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erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory. Andre v. Morrow, l 06 
Idaho 455, 680 P.2d 1355 (1984). Given that a meritorious defense must established and "plead" 
"with particularity," Myers' appeal must be denied. 
F. The Default Judgment was a fmal judgment under IRCP 54(a). 
Myers' three-sentence argument in its opening brief is that because SIC sought either a 
money judgment or to compel Myers to arbitrate their dispute, and the trial court entered a 
money judgment, the judgment was not final because the arbitration request remained an open 
issue. Myers' argument is without merit. After SIC obtained a money judgment there was no 
need to arbitrate the dispute to find out if Myers owed SIC money. SIC elected the only 
reasonable form of alternative relief it could take under the circumstances of having obtained a 
default. ~ere was no need to arbitrate after receiving the award, and the judgment was final. 
G. The district court properly awarded SIC its attorneys' fees and costs. 
"The award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the district court and 
reviewed for an abuse of that discretion." Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 
Idaho 927,342 P.3d 639,644 (2015) (citing Smith v. Washington Cnty., 150 Idaho 388,392,247 
P.3d 615,619 (2010); Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006)). 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding SIC its fees and costs as the 
prevailing party in the litigation. Based upon the points and authorities set forth in this brief, SIC 
remains the prevailing party, and the trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to SIC 
should be upheld. 
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H. This Court should deny Myers' attorneys' fees and costs on appeal and 
should award SIC its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against 
the appeal. 
Based upon Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and the terms of the parties' Agreement, the 
prevailing party in litigation shall be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs. SIC 
therefore respectfully requests an award of its fees and costs on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
SIC respectfully requests that the District Court's decision to deny Myers' motion to set 
aside the default judgment be upheld, and that SIC be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and 
costs incurred in defending this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this If" day of January 2016. 
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